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Over the past few years, most of the industrialized world has experienced a
major financial crisis, the worst of the post-war era. This crisis was followed
by a global recession, whose effects are still evident in many economies. A
distinguishing feature of the present downturn was the significant disruption of
financial intermediation.
During financial crises, financing costs tend to increase. After the Lehman
Brothers collapse the credit costs peaked, which was considered to be a major
factor in the fall of durable goods spending in the last quarter of 2008. This in
turn was followed by a contraction in output and a rise in unemployment.
In the attempt to stabilize credit markets, authorities embraced a variety of
unconventional monetary and fiscal policies. The Federal Funds was cut until
the zero bound was reached, and the Federal Reserve began to act directly
by injecting funds into private markets, aiming to reduce credit costs. While
expanding central bank intermediation, the Fed attempts to offset the disruption
of private financial intermediation.
Motivated by these events, there as been a growing literature that incor-
porates financial factors within the quantitative macroeconomic framework. In
Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) much of this work is surveyed. In order to illus-
trate how a disruption in financial intermediation can induce a downturn in
the economy, but also to analyze quantitatively how the unconventional credit
policies of the central banks might work during a financial crisis, they develop a
baseline framework that incorporates financial intermediation. As in Bernanke
and Gertler (1989) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), an agency problem between
borrowers and lenders is introduced. This agency problem endogenizes financial
market frictions. In Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) and Gertler and Karadi (2011)
(GKa, henceforth) a distinct approach is used when it is assumed that the credit
constraints are not faced by the non-financial borrowers, but by financial inter-
mediaries instead. Here the credit spread depends on their balance sheets, in
particular on the level of their internal funds.
The analysis in GKa is focused on the policies adopted by public authorities
in the United States in response to the 2008 financial crisis. In that framework,
the central bank acts as a financial intermediary during crisis periods. During
a financial crisis, with a disruption of private credit channels, a central bank
intervenes to compensate for that disruption.
Private intermediation on the other hand, is more efficient during normal
times. These intermediaries obtain funds from depositors and channel them
to non-financial firms. In addition, an agency problem is introduced so that
borrowing and lending depends on intermediaries capital structure. The credit
costs in the economy, that impact real activity, are also affected by interme-
diaries own funds. This feedback between the financial and the real sector is
usually referred to as the “financial accelerator” effect. In a crisis event with a
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deterioration of intermediaries funds, financing costs increase. This depresses
real activity, that in turn further deteriorates the balance sheet of the banks.
The setup used in Correia et al. (2012) builds on the framework developed in
GKa. However here the central bank does not work as a financial intermediary.
The assumptions on the structure of private intermediaries are nevertheless iden-
tical. In this economy, firms need funds in order to pay the wage bill. Financial
intermediaries provide these funds, using deposits and their own internal funds.
They accumulate internal funds because of a costly enforcement problem: the
managers of the “banks” have the possibility, in the beginning of each period,
to divert a fraction of their assets (claims on non-financial firms). Accordingly,
in order for intermediaries to be willing to continue to operate, the fraction of
assets they can divert in each period has to be balanced by the discounted value
of the retained earnings from their activity. As we will see in more detail in the
next section as long as this constraint is binding, the credit spread (defined as
the difference between the return on loans to the firms and the nominal interest
rate) is positive. Without this incentive compatibility constraint, intermediaries
would expand their assets until the rates of return adjust so that the difference
between nominal interest rate and the return on financial assets was zero.
In this MSc dissertation, I will introduce this model and present the nu-
merical solutions of the responses to various exogenous shocks. With this it is
possible to evaluate how the financial friction introduced affects the economy.
The impulse responses refer to an equilibrium in which policy is described by
the first order conditions of a Ramsey planner. With this exercise it was possi-
ble to understand that in this setup there are multiple optimal policy responses
to a shock: it is possible, for any given initial price level, to choose a path for
the nominal interest rate that is consistent with first best allocations. Indeter-
minacy in price level is not a surprising result in a standard monetary model,
but in this framework nominal funds of intermediaries are predetermined. These
intermediaries are financially constrained and so real assets required for produc-
tion every period are restricted by banks’ balance sheets. Here indeterminacy
in price level implies multiple optimal decisions for the nominal interest rate.
I will present this result with an illustration in the concluding section of this
dissertation.
The structure of this paper is as follows. In Part II, I start by outlining the
environment and describing the equilibrium conditions. Also, I briefly describe
a steady state of the model. In Part III, I provide the numerical results of
the impluse responses to three different shocks. I also discuss the result that
in this framework there are multiple optimal policy decisions and provide an




The model that will be analyzed throughout this text is presented in Correia et
al. (2012). In this economy, firms need external funds to finance production.
They raise these funds in the beginning of each period in order to pay for the
wage bill.
There is single good produced with a linear technology that uses labor only.
Aggregate productivity is stochastic, and there are no idiosyncratic shocks.
The representative household has a continuum of members of measure unity,
and has preferences over consumption and labor. These members can be of two
different types: “workers” or financial intermediaries, “bankers”. Workers supply
labor to production; bankers manage a financial intermediary.
The financial intermediaries channel funds from depositors to firms. They
finance production with deposits from households and their own internal funds.
Because of a costly enforcement problem, banks need to have internal funds.
If the bankers would be able to operate forever, they could accumulate enough
funds so that they would eventually become financially unrestricted. Accord-
ingly in this setup it is assumed to occur a shift between occupations of the
household members: every period there is a certain fraction of bankers that
become workers, and of workers that become bankers. In this way expected
lifetime of bankers is finite.
In the following subsections, we will look with more detail into the structure
of this economy.
1. Production
Before describing the economy with financial intermediaries, let us describe
the physical environment. The aggregate uncertainty in period t ≥ 0 is described
by the random variable st ∈ St, where St is the set of possible realizations of
st. The history of its realizations up to period t (state at t), (s0, s1, ..., st), is
denoted by st ∈ St. We assume that st has a discrete distribution. Pr(s
t+1|st)
is the probability of state st+1 conditional on state st. Variables indexed by t
are thus a function of the state st.
There is a representative firm endowed with a stochastic technology that
transforms Nt units of labor into AtNt units of output. lnAt is an AR(1)
aggregate productivity shock. In the beginning of period t, the firm needs to
pay the salaries, before receiving the revenues from production. They have to
raise external funds St in order to pay the wage bill, WtNt:
WtNt ≤ St (1)
In the end of each period, profits are then given by




with Yt representing period t output, Pt the price and R
l
t the gross interest rate
paid for the loans to the firms.





The household sector is structured in a way that permits maintaining the
tractability of the representative agent approach.
A representative household is a continuum of members of measure unity.
Within each household, there is a fraction 1− f of “workers” and f of “bankers”.
Workers supply labor and return their labor income back to the household;
bankers manage a financial intermediary and similarly transfer earnings back to
the household, at the time they exit the banking activity. The entire household
shares consumption.
Over time, a given individual of the household can switch between the two
occupations. In particular, a member who is a banker in period t continues as a
banker in the subsequent period with a given i.i.d. probability θ. As will become
clear in the following sub-section, this finite time horizon for the bankers insures
that they don’t live enough so that they can eventually overcome the financial
constraints they face, i.e. that they don’t retain enough earnings so that they
can finance all the production with their own funds only. As a consequence, in
each period (1 − θ)f bankers exit and become workers. To keep the number
in each occupation constant over time, a similar number of workers randomly
become bankers. When exiting, bankers transfer their accumulated earnings to
the household. As will be described in more detail in the next sub-section, the
household gives the new bankers some start-up funds in order for them to start
operating as financial intermediaries.
In the beginning of period t, households decide on one-period riskless de-
posits denominated in units of currency Dt that pay RtDt in period t+ 1. The
households also decides on a portfolio of nominal state-contingent bonds, Bt+1,
each paying one unit of currency in a particular state in period t + 1 and each
costing Qt,t+1 units of money at t.
With wealth in the beginning of period t given by Ωt, the households budget
constraint is
EtQt,t+1Bt+1 +Dt ≤ Ωt,




where Et is the mathematical expectation conditional on the household’s time
t information set, Ct is time t consumption, Pt the corresponding price, Nt is
hours worked and Wt nominal wage. Π
b
t are funds transferred to the household
from financial intermediaries (net the transfer households give to its members
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that enter the banking activity in period t), and Tt are lump sum taxes
charged by the government.
The household has preferences over consumption and hours worked, that are









where u is a strictly concave one-period utility function and β ∈ (0, 1) is a
discount factor.
The household maximizes (4) subject to (3) and a no-Ponzi games condition.
It is further assumed that u is separable in consumption and labor.
























A financial intermediary channels funds from depositors to the firms.
Let Zj,t be the amount of net worth that a given bank j has at the end
of period t; Dj,t the deposits from households, and Sj,t the financial claims on
firms that the intermediary holds. A bank’s balance sheet is then given by
Sj,t = Zj,t +Dj,t (8)
Households deposits pay the non-contingent gross return Rt, while interme-
diary assets pay the endogenously determined return Rlt over period t.
Thus bank’s internal funds evolve over time as the difference between earn-
ings on assets and interest rate payments on households’ deposits. Accordingly,
Zj,t+1 = R
l
tSj,t −RtDj,t = (R
l
t −Rt)Sj,t +RtZj,t (9)
Since financial intermediaries face a financing constraint, they are willing to
retain earnings until exiting activity, at which point they transfer accumulated
earnings as dividends to the household. Then the intermediaries’ objective is to
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Looking at the previous expression we know that, in any period, while the
discount factor Qt,t+1+s(R
l
t+s −Rt+s) is positive, the intermediary will want to
borrow additional funds from depositors in order to increase its assets. A limit
on their ability to do is motivated by an incentive compatibility constraint: at
the beginning of each period, a banker can choose to divert a fraction λ of its
assets.2 If they do so, they are forced into bankruptcy and depositors can recover
the remaining fraction. It is too costly however for depositors to recover the
funds diverted. Accordingly, bank managers are willing to continue to operate
as long as the amount they loose when diverting funds (the discounted value
of retained earnings) is at least balanced by the fraction of funds they can
appropriate. This condition can be written as:
Vj,t ≥ λSj,t (11)
As shown in Appendix A, the value function Vj,t can be written in a separable
way:





















The weights υt and ηt on the value function have the interpretation of the
expected marginal gain to the banker of expanding assets or net worth by one
unit, respectively, while holding the other variable constant. Without the agency
problem that was introduced, bankers would expand borrowing to a point where
rates of return would adjust to ensure υt was zero. However, if the incentive
constraint is binding, intermediary’s claims on firms are constrained by their
level of internal funds.
Making use of this property, the incentive constraint can be rewritten as
υtSj,t + ηtZj,t ≥ λSj,t (15)
2One may think, as pointed out in Gertler and Karadi (2009), that intermediaries receive
deposits from families other than the one they are members of.
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Assuming this constraint holds with equality, the nominal assets that an in-





Zj,t ≡ φtZj,t (16)
where φt is what I call the leverage ratio, the ratio of intermediated assets to
internal funds.
Expanding Sj,t while holding Zj,t constant increases bankers incentive to
divert funds. With internal funds Zj,t positive, the financial constraint is binding
for 0 < υt < λt. As noted before, under this condition it is profitable for
the banker to increase assets’ level Sj,t, since υt > 0. If υt increases above
λ the incentive constraint does not bind since the value of the intermediary’s
discounted earnings, or franchise value Vj,t, always exceeds the the fraction of
funds that can be appropriated.
The banks net worth can be expressed using the relations derived above.


































Note that the evolution of internal funds for a given intermediary j does
not depend on individual specific factors. We can then sum across individuals
to obtain aggregate assets and internal funds of the financial intermediaries.
However, when doing so for the internal funds of the banks, we must take
into account that in each period only a fraction θ of banks survive (continue
to operate). In addition, new banks start their activity each period. As a
consequence, the internal funds of bankers in period t is the sum of the funds
of existing banks Zet and new banks Z
n
t . The share of retained earnings that






It is assumed that the household transfers a small fraction of the internal
funds that exiting bank had in the end of the previous period. If households
transfer a fraction ω1−θ of these funds in the end period t − 1, then the “new”


















The government spends Gt and finances spending collecting lump sum taxes
Tt. In this setting, government spending is assumed to be an exogenous share g
of production every period, as in Fiore et al (2010). The government also issues
outside money held by the banks in the form of non-remunerated reserves.
The fact that g > 0 will make it optimal to distort the consumption-leisure
margin, even if lump sum taxes are available. This parameter pins down the
steady state gross return on loans to the firms. With a positive share of gov-
ernment expenditure, the gross return on assets is greater than 1. Also, with a
binding financial constraint, the spread (the difference between return on assets
and nominal interest rate) is always positive, as noted before. Thus in this setup,
for g high enough, the steady state nominal interest rate is greater than zero,
so we can abstract from the zero lower bound while studying optimal policy in
response to small shocks.
4. Equilibria
The equilibrium conditions are given by equation (1) holding with equality,




condition (22), and the resource constraint
Ct +Gt = AtNt.
In the next subsection we will define a steady state with constant inflation
and discuss some features of the steady state economy.
4.1. Steady State













uC and uN denote marginal utilities of consumption and labor evaluated at the













WN = S (25)





The first condition is the Euler equation given by (7) in the steady state.
The second condition is the steady state condition for the consumption-labor
choice (5) together with the firm’s profit maximization condition, equation (2).
The fourth condition represents the steady state financing restriction of firms,
condition (1), that holds with equality. The last two conditions result from
the incentive constraint (16) of intermediaries and the definition of the leverage
ratio.
















In a steady state described by the conditions above, the aggregate amount
of internal funds of the banks is constant in real terms, which means that





The growth rates of assets and internal funds for each intermediary are also
constant and equal to
ζ = ξ = (Rl −R)φ+R (31)
As discussed before, as long as the balance sheet constraint on intermediaries
is binding we have υ > 0. In this instance, condition (28) implies that the
spread (defined as the difference between the return on loans to the firms and
the nominal interest rate) is positive. Thus one can see that for a higher steady
state gross inflation, i.e. a higher nominal interest rate, the intratemporal wedge
increases.






















The steady state leverage ratio can be expressed as a function of exogenous
parameters only. Using conditions (27), (28) and (29),
φ =
β(1− θ)
λ [θ(1− β) + ω]
We can immediately see that banks will decrease steady state leverage when
the appropriation share λ increases, with everything else equal. In other words,
if intermediaries have the possibility of appropriating a higher share of the assets
they hold, then they will be required to have a higher level of internal funds.
Accordingly, the steady state spread also increases (so that, for the same level
of assets, retained earnings increase).
In the next section, I will describe the parametrization of the model and
some experiments that illustrate how the economy reacts in response to shocks




The model calibration requires 7 parameters, 4 of them are conventional.
The parameter values are listed in Table 1. Utility is assumed to be logarithmic
in consumption and linear in leisure. The discount factor β is standard. The
values for the relative utility weight on labor χ and the inverse of the Frisch
elasticity of labor supply ϕ, are in accordance with the estimate reported in
Primiceri et al. (2006), as in GKa.
The parameters related with the financial intermediaries are also chosen in
line with what is done in GKa, so that the following three targets are met: a
steady state interest rate spread of one hundred basis points; a steady state
leverage ratio of four; and an average horizon of bankers of a decade4.
The government consumption share g is chosen high enough so that a rea-
sonably small but positive steady state nominal interest rate is achieved (as in
Fiore, Teles and Tristani, 2010).
3Under reasonable parameter values the constraint always binds within a local region of
the steady state.
4As in GKa, the choice of these parameters is meant to be suggestive.
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Households
β 0.99 Discount rate
χ 3.409 Relative utility weight of labor
ϕ 0.276 Inverse Fisch elasticity of labor supply
Financial Intermediaries
λ 0.28 Fraction of assets that can be diverted
ω 0.01 Proportional transfer to entering banks
θ 0.975 Survival rate of bankers
Government
g 0.02 Output share of government expenditure
Table 1: Parameters.
Government expenditure being proportional to output every period is a tech-
nical device to abstract from the zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate.
It makes it optimal to distort the consumption-labor decision even if lump sum
taxes are available. This is a second best result, and although the solutions
presented in the following subsections show allocations that are the same as the
ones that result from the maximization of preferences subject to the resource
constraint, they incorporate a policy restriction of having an exogenously given
proportional government expenditure. If g was to be set optimally, then gov-
ernment expenditure would be zero and as a consequence the return on assets
Rl would be one. With a positive spread, this would imply having negative
nominal interest rates.
The experiments of the next subsection show how the economy behaves in
response to three exogenous shocks. An innovation shock, a financial shock and
a government expenditure shock are considered.
Optimal impulse responses result from policy described by the first order
conditions of a Ramsey planner choosing allocations for periods t ≥ 1 in accor-
dance with the timeless perspective in Woodford (2003).
The results displayed below represent the log-linear dynamics of the model.
6. Impulse responses
Optimal policy in this setup requires setting the rate of return on financial
claims higher than one as long as g > 0. As noted before, the calibrated model
displays a positive steady state nominal interest rate, so the optimal response
to small shocks that requires movements in the nominal interest rate can be
studied ignoring the zero lower bound. For the numerical results displayed in
the subsections below I used Dynare and Dynare++5, that computes the first
order conditions of an optimal policy given the constraints, that are then solved
5The package is available at http://www.dynare.org/
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Figure 1: Impulse response to a positive technology shock under optimal policy.
Correlation of the shock: 0.9.
in the usual way. I have also had access to the Dynare codes provided by the
authors, that I used mostly for comparison purposes.
6.1. Technology shock
Figure 1 illustrates the impulse response of the selected variables to a positive
one percent technology shock6, with a quarterly autoregressive coefficient of
0.9. The variables plotted are the technology process at ≡ ln(At), inflation
πt ≡ ln(Pt+1/Pt), consumption ct ≡ ln(Ct), real wage wt ≡ ln(Wt/Pt), real
assets st ≡ ln(St/Pt) and real internal funds zt ≡ ln(Zt/Pt).
Fig. 1 shows that allocations are as in the first best, with consumption
following production exactly and hours worked (not shown) remaining constant
throughout the adjustment.
In response to a positive productivity shock, price level decreases in the first
period. Here a one percent decrease in price level on impact matches exactly
the amplitude of the shock. In this way, and since nominal internal funds
are predetermined, the financial restriction is satisfied with real assets and real
funds changing by the same percentage deviation. Hence leverage stays constant
during all the adjustment period.
In the subsequent periods, the adjustment is made through a smooth increase
in price level. All the variables return gradually to their steady state values.
6A negative shock would produce symmetric results of the ones presented here.
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Figure 2: Impulse responses to an increase in the government expenditure share
under optimal policy. Correlation of the shock: 0.9.
Inflation completely offsets the effect of the shock. With nominal wage
constant during the transition, nominal assets required to finance production
are constant too. The return on assets is constant, and since leverage remains
constant the spread is also constant in all the periods. This in turn implies
that the marginal value of assets and internal funds don’t change so that the
financial sector is isolated from the effect of the shock.
6.2. Government expenditure shock
Government expenditure is assumed to be exogenously given as a fraction
gt of output every period, that pins down the steady sate return on loans and
consequently the steady state nominal interest rate.
The impulse response to a temporary one percent shock on gt produces
effects on inflation, nominal interest rate rt ≡ ln(Rt), the gross rate of return
on loans rlt ≡ ln(R
l
t), as well as real assets, real internal funds and consumption
ct ≡ ln(Ct). This can be analyzed in Figure 2.
With Rlt moving in response to a government expenditure shock, it is optimal
that both nominal interest rate and price level change on impact. Consumption
choices are distorted but are the same as in a first best solution. With hours
worked remaining at the steady state level, adjusting the price level to compen-
sate for the increase in the borrowing cost of producers allows nominal wages
and consequently nominal assets of intermediaries to remain constant. Since
nominal internal funds are predetermined, the fact that nominal assets are able
to be kept constant during the transition implies that the financial constraint
6.3 Financial shock 14















































Figure 3: Impulse responses to a positive financial shock under optimal policy.
Correlation of the shock: 0.9.
is satisfied with leverage remaining at the steady state. This is similar to the
case of a productivity shock, but here nominal interest rates offset the change
in the return on loans, so that spreads remain constant throughout all the ad-
justment process. In this way, the financial sector is again isolated. Production
is not affected and consumption adjusts smoothly to the increase in government
expenditure.
Also here the spread remains unchanged in response to the shock, and then
optimal policy can be such that the financial constraint does not kick in, in the
sense that leverage is always constant.
6.3. Financial shock
A financial shock is characterized as an increase (or decrease) in the appro-
priation parameter λt of the financial intermediaries. If we consider a case where
there is a positive increment in this share, the result is that for the same level
of assets at the moment of the shock, a higher level of internal funds is required
by the depositors. But in this setup internal funds are predetermined, so an
optimal response displays spreads compensating on impact for the exogenous
tightening of the financial restriction on intermediaries.
In the experiment considered in Figure 3, a one percent increase in the
parameter λt is simulated. Contrary to the previous two shocks, the spread
between the lending and the deposits rate ∆t ≡ ln(R
l
t/Rt) and the leverage
ratio ϕt ≡ ln(St/Zt) are no longer constant during the transition. As can be
seen in the figure, leverage decreases with the increase in real funds. Real assets
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stay constant, and nominal interest rate changes so that the spread increases
on impact. This change in the spread compensates for the more demanding
conditions of intermediaries financing restriction. Accordingly, the weights of
the financial constraint, i.e. the relative value of assets and internal funds of
intermediaries, change on impact.
It is nevertheless possible to have the adjustment occurring in the financial
sector only, with allocations not distorted provided that the return on loans
remains constant. In this instance there is no effect on output, consumption or
hours worked.
After the second period, all variables start to smoothly converge towards the
steady state.
Both in the case of a productivity shock and a government expenditure shock,
since the spread is constant during the transition, the fact that internal funds are
predetermined does not play a role as a restriction in the sense that since leverage
stays constant, the incentive compatibility constraint is not affected. Thus the
adjustment can be such that the financial sector is isolated and allocations are
not distorted. In contrast, in the case of the financial shock the spread changes
but the return on loans is kept constant, i.e. the intratemporal wedge is constant,
and the allocations are again as in the first best.
If the spread changes in a given period, this implies nominal funds growing at
a different rate for the subsequent period. Since it is optimal to have the return
on loans constant or following government share of output dynamics, when
spreads move nominal interest rate moves too. When the accommodation of the
shock is made using price level policy only, as shown above for the productivity
and government expenditure shocks, nominal interest rate either stays constant
or moves accordingly so that the spread is constant during the adjustment. This
is so because when inflation completely offsets the effects of shocks, nominal
assets remain constant and since internal funds are predetermined, leverage
stays constant. If the spread was to move on impact, the marginal value of
internal funds and assets on intermediaries balance sheet would be changing,
and thus leverage, so that we could no longer have nominal assets unchanged.
The first order approximations of the impulse responses under optimal policy
can be performed using Dynare. We can also use Dynare++ to solve the same
problem, and while doing so I obtained solutions that were not the same as the
ones presented in the last subsections. The solutions using Dynare have the
common feature that the accommodation of the shock is made exclusively using
price level policy. With the exception of the financial shock, spreads remain
constant during the convergence towards the steady state. In contrast with
Dynare++ we obtain multiple optimal policy responses.
For a given price level on impact, there is a corresponding nominal interest
rate path that is able to replicate the first best allocations. This was a somehow
unexpected result. In this framework optimal policy does not pin down price
level, a usual result in a standard monetary model, and this implies multiple
optimal nominal interest rate decisions. Even though real assets required to
finance production are restricted by predetermined nominal internal funds, there
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is always a pair of price level and nominal interest rate decisions that replicates
first best allocations, so that we obtain multiple nominal interest rate paths that
solve the planner’s problem.
In the next subsection I present an example of this result.
6.4. An example of multiple optimal policy trajectories







































































Figure 4: One percent uncorrelated productivity shock.
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For simplification, let us consider an uncorrelated one percent productivity
shock. Figure 4 shows two different nominal interest rate and price level paths
that are optimal responses to this shock. In black, there is what I will refer to
as the baseline solution. It is similar to the one seen before Figure 1, in the
sense that the financial sector is isolated because spreads are constant during
the transition.
The blue lines refer to a solution where that is not the case, i.e. nominal
interest rate changes on impact and the accommodation of the shock is not made
exclusively with inflation. Both solutions provide allocations as in the first best,
i.e. hours worked remaining constant and consumption following productivity
one-to-one. The gross return on loans is constant too. In the baseline case,
with spreads constant during the transition, the leverage ratio and the relative
weights of assets and internal funds of banks’ restriction are also constant. In
contrast, the alternative solution with nominal interest rate changing, leverage
and the relative value of funds and assets changes. In this way, the restriction on
financial intermediaries is satisfied precisely with a change in the relative value
of assets and retained earnings. When inflation does not completely offset the
shock, nominal assets change due to the change in nominal wage. Since internal
funds of intermediaries are predetermined in each period, the only way to satisfy
the condition on banks capital structure is to change the relative value of its
components during the adjustment. This can be seen in Figure 4(b), noting that
η and υ decrease in the first period, in contrast with the baseline solution where
these weights remain constant. This variation is accompanied with a change in
nominal interest rate on impact, and thus the spread, that affects the value of
assets and internal funds in the intermediaries objective function.
In Appendix B, I analyze the conditions that define equilibria in this model
and show that the system of equations is indeterminate, confirming the result
illustrated in Figure 4.
Part IV
Concluding remarks
In this MSc dissertation, I analyzed the model presented in Correia et al. (2012).
I discussed the result that optimal policy is not uniquely determined. The
results presented in subsections 6.1 and 6.2 are what I referred to as the base-
line solutions. Here optimal policy requires price level to offset the effects of
the shock, while the nominal interest rate path is such that spreads are al-
ways constant during the adjustment. Optimal policy in response to a financial
shock has spreads changing so that the marginal value of assets and own funds
compensates for the tightening of the financial restriction on banks’ balance
sheets. In any case, provided that the return on financial assets is constant the
consumption-labor choice is not distorted and allocations are as in the first best.
I show that these solutions are not unique. In this economy firms need
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external funds in order to pay the wage bill. Financial intermediaries channel
funds from depositors to firms, and need to accumulate internal funds during the
period of their activity due to a costly enforcement problem and because they
don’t live forever. A positive credit spread emerges as the difference between the
return on their assets and the risk free return on deposits. As noted before, the
exogenously given output share of government expenditure determines the rate
of return on loans to the firms, so that for positive government expenditure it is
optimal to distort the intratemporal choice of the agents, even when lump sum
taxation is available. Under optimal policy, the spread that affects the marginal
value of the banks’ balance sheet components is determined by the nominal
interest rate, since the financing cost of firms is constant while government
expenditure is constant. In this framework real assets are required to finance
production every period. Due to an agency problem between borrowers and
lenders, these assets are restricted by intermediaries’ level of internal funds that
are predetermined. Thus in a given period the price level determines the real
value of intermediaries internal funds. I showed that for a given price there is
a corresponding optimal nominal interest rate path that satisfies the financial
restriction and simultaneously replicates first best allocations. This leads to





Bankers objective is to maximize expected terminal wealth



















(1− θ)EtQt,t+1Zj,t+1 +MaxEtQt,t+1θVj,t+1(Zj,t+1, Sj,t+1)
The conjecture is Vj,t(Zj,t, Sj,t) = υtSj,t + ηtZj,t . Assuming the incentive
compatibility constraint is binding:
υtSj,t + ηtZj,t = λSj,t









+EtQt,t+1θ [υt+1Sj,t+1 + ηt+1Zj,t+1]
























+EtQt,t+1θ [υt+1ξt,t+1Sj,t + ηt+1ζt,t+1Zj,t]
Accordingly, by inspection it is possible to write the expressions for υt and








ηt = Et {(1 − θ) +Qt,t+1θζt,t+1ηt+1}
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Appendix B
Let us start by summarizing the conditions that define the equilibrium of


















St = φtZt (.5)

















































and the resource constraint
Ct +Gt = AtNt (.10)
Considering the example in Figure .4, we can study the necessary and suf-
ficient conditions that define this problem. Given the first best allocations,
condition (.1) is satisfied provided that the gross return on loans to the firms,
Rlt, is constant and at the steady state. Condition (.2) can be satisfied with
Wt and (.3) with nominal assets St. The Euler condition (.4) can be satisfied
with prices Pt. The financial constraint, expressed in condition (.5), with the
leverage ratio defined as in (.7) and the weights given by (.8) and (.9), can be
satisfied with a spread that is defined by the nominal interest rate Rt. And this
is for any given level of nominal internal funds Zt, that are predetermined in
period t. But while proceeding in this way it seems that we have already pinned
down price level.
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For simplification, let us consider now the deterministic case and describe
the preferences of the household, and then proceed to investigate the existence
of indeterminacy in the system of equations.







we can rewrite conditions (.8) and (.9) as
υt =
{







ηt = {(1 − θ) + θ [∆tφt + 1] ηt+1} (.12)
where we have already used (.4) to simplify the two expressions.
Preferences are described by











and government expenditure given by
Gt = gAtNt







Hence, from condition (.1) we have that Rlt = 1 for every t.
From conditions (.2) and (.3), taking the first best allocations as above and
using Wt, we have that
PtCt = St








If the financial constraint (.5) holds, we can write a condition implied by






Using this with the law of motion of capital accumulation to substitute out











[∆tφt + 1] (.13)
The left hand side of this equation can be written in terms of steady state
inflation and nominal interest rate, using the conditions in subsection 2.4.1:
Π
R
= (θ + ω) [∆φ+ 1]
or
β = (θ + ω) [∆φ+ 1]












Under these conditions, using condition (.7) and substituting the weights by
(.11) and (.12), we have
φt(λ− υt) = ηt
φtλ− (1− θ)∆tφt − θ [∆tφt + 1] υt+1φt+1 = (1− θ) + θ [∆tφt + 1] ηt+1
or
φtλ− (1− θ) [∆tφt + 1] = θ [∆tφt + 1] (ηt+1 + υt+1φt+1)
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Note that ηt+1 + υt+1φt+1 = φt+1λ, by the definition (.7)
Then
φtλ− (1− θ) [∆tφt + 1] = θ [∆tφt + 1]φt+1λ
or






, or φt+1, only appears once in the two conditions left. We
can use the condition (.14) to substitute it out in the last one, yielding





(1− θ [∆φ+ 1])
1− θ
(.15)
Recalling that in a steady state with constant inflation, the expressions of
the weights on the financial constraint give
η =
[

















This is a necessary and sufficient condition, so that for any nominal interest
ratio choice at t (with Rlt fixed) we have a corresponding leverage ratio that
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